

*United States Marine Corps
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2076 South Street
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Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

PEACE OPERATIONS: What a JTF Commander Can Expect

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

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AY 00-01

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Date: _____

Report Documentation Page		
Report Date 2002	Report Type N/A	Dates Covered (from... to) - -
Title and Subtitle Peace Operations: What a JTF Command Can Expect		Contract Number
		Grant Number
		Program Element Number
Author(s)		Project Number
		Task Number
		Work Unit Number
Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Joint Military Operations Department Navy War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207		Performing Organization Report Number
Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)		Sponsor/Monitor's Acronym(s)
		Sponsor/Monitor's Report Number(s)
Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited		
Supplementary Notes		
Abstract This study characterizes those peace operations (POs) conducted as the result of U.S. armed forces forcibly entering a country, defeating enemy armed forces, and establishing a government. This study examines POs conducted in conjunction with World War II, Operation Urgent Fury, Operation JUST CAUSE, and Operation DESERT STORM. This study will show that peace operations fall into three types: (1) the restoration of law and order; (2) the provision of humanitarian assistance; and (3) the establishment and stabilization of politically acceptable governments.		
Subject Terms		
Report Classification unclassified	Classification of this page unclassified	
Classification of Abstract unclassified	Limitation of Abstract UU	
Number of Pages 45		

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		FORM APPROVED - - - OMB NO. 0704-0188	
<small>PUBLIC REPORTING BURDEN FOR THIS COLLECTION OF INFORMATION IS ESTIMATED TO AVERAGE 1 HOUR PER RESPONSE, INCLUDING THE TIME FOR REVIEWING INSTRUCTIONS, SEARCHING EXISTING DATA SOURCES, GATHERING AND MAINTAINING THE DATA NEEDED, AND COMPLETING AND REVIEWING THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION. SEND COMMENTS REGARDING THIS BURDEN ESTIMATE OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THIS COLLECTION OF INFORMATION, INCLUDING SUGGESTIONS FOR REDUCING THIS BURDEN, TO WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES, DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND REPORTS, 1215 JEFFERSON DAVIS HIGHWAY, SUITE 1204, ARLINGTON, VA 22202-4302, AND TO THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (0704-0188) WASHINGTON, DC 20503</small>			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (LEAVE BLANK)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE PEACE OPERATIONS: WHAT A JTF COMMANDER CAN EXPECT		5. FUNDING NUMBERS N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJOR THOMAS E DOLAN, USMC			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 2076 SOUTH STREET, MCCDC, QUANTICO, VA 22134-5068		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER NONE	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SAME AS #7.		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER: NONE	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES NONE			
12A. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT NO RESTRICTIONS		12B. DISTRIBUTION CODE N/A	
13. ABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS) This study characterizes those peace operations (PO's) conducted as the result of U.S. armed forces forcibly entering a country, defeating enemy armed forces, and establishing a government. This study examines PO's conducted in conjunction with World War II, Operation Urgent Fury, Operation JUST CAUSE, and Operation DESERT STORM. This study will show that peace operations fall into three types: (1) the restoration of law and order; (2) the provision of humanitarian assistance; and (3) the establishment and stabilization of politically acceptable governments.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS (KEY WORDS ON WHICH TO PERFORM SEARCH) Peace Operations, Civil Affairs, Military Operations Other than War, MOOTW		15. NUMBER OF PAGES: 39	
		16. PRICE CODE: N/A	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE: UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

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Preface

The purpose of this study is to characterize a particular subset of peace operations, specifically those peace operations in which U.S. Armed Forces have conducted a forced entry into another country, defeated the enemy's armed forces, and established a new national government or reestablished a government in exile. In characterizing this particular class of peace operations, the author hopes to provide the reader a framework within which the Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations can be better utilized.

To aid the reader, the following information is provided for the conflicts of this study:

1. World War II
 - a. U.S. at war with Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan): 11 December 1941
 - b. Government of Italy surrendered to the Allies: 8 September 1943
 - c. Germany surrenders to Allies: 7 May 1945
 - d. Allied control of German government established: 5 June 1945
 - e. Japan surrendered to Allies: 2 September 1945
 - f. Japanese military disarmed: mid-1946
2. Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada)
 - a. Dates of combat operations: 25 October 1983—3 November 1983
 - b. Government of Grenada removed and new government established: 26 October 1983
3. Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama)
 - a. Dates of combat operations: 20 December 1989—24 December 1989
 - b. New government of Panama established: 19 December 1989
4. Operation DESERT STORM (Southwest Asia)
 - a. Dates of combat operation: 17 January 1991—27 February 1991
 - b. Government of Kuwait reestablished: approximately 6 March 1991

Peace Operations

In 1997, General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in the National Military Strategy for the United States that the “foremost task” of the U.S. Armed Forces: “to fight and win our Nation’s wars.” Additionally, he stated that decisive force would be a principle that would govern the employment of U.S. Armed Forces. Decisive Force is the “commitment of sufficient military power to overwhelm an adversary, establish new military conditions, and achieve a political resolution favorable to U.S. national interests.”¹

Obviously, decisive force includes the conduct of combat operations; however, decisive force also includes the conduct of peace operations. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, defines peace operations (PO) as:

military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement...conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict....[Additionally,] Military PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict.²

While “decisive force” and “peace operations” are relatively new terms in joint doctrine and thought, U.S. Armed Forces have conducted peace operations since 1942 in countries including France, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Germany, Japan, Grenada, Panama,

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era, n.p., 1997. URL: <<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/nms.html>>. Accessed 27 January 2000.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington, DC: GPO, 16 June 1995. III-12.

and Kuwait. In each of these countries, U.S. Armed Forces conducted combat operations to defeat enemy forces and peace operations to reach a long-term political settlement.

Historically, the study of peace operations has overshadowed by combat operations. Because existing joint doctrine on the role of United States Armed Forces in the conduct of peace operations is minuscule as compared to combat operations, the Joint Warfighting Center published the *Joint Task Force Handbook for Peace Operations*. The Handbook assists the Joint Force Commander by providing some doctrinal direction with an overview of: Joint Task Force (JTF) responsibilities and challenges; mission considerations; civil-military relationships; considerations for transitioning to non-U.S. military control; refugee, displaced person, or migrant camp operations; and training, logistics, intelligence, and legal support considerations when conducting peace operations.

The Handbook gives the Joint Force Commander many considerations, and states, “There is no standard peace operations mission. Each peace operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.”³ However, while this quotation is true, the Handbook, fails to characterize the peace operations a Joint Force Commander could expect to conduct before, during, and after a conflict.

Because of the Handbook’s deficiency, this paper will characterize the peace operations a Joint Force Commander can expect to conduct when U.S. Armed Forces conduct combat operations in another country to defeat the enemy’s armed forces and establish a new national government. This characterization will be based on those peace operations engaged in by U.S. Armed Forces for the following conflicts: World War II in Europe and Asia, Operation

URGENT FURY in Grenada, Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, and Operation DESERT STORM in Kuwait.

This paper will show that peace operations fall into three primary types. These categories are not meant to reflect a sequence in time or a priority in mission, but instead, they provide the means to recognize what kinds of military activities are present in peace operations. They are: first, the restoration of law and order; second, the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and last, the establishment and stabilization of politically acceptable governments. Each of these will be addressed in turn.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07, III-12. Joint Warfighting Center. *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997. I-1

Operations to Restore Law and Order

The first characteristic of peace operations is that they are operations to restore law and order. As U.S. combat forces have moved into or through combat areas, historically, they have often encountered public disorder; in some areas, local populace had neither a police force nor public officials to administer a police force. To restore and maintain law and order during and after conflict, U.S. military personnel have established curfews, conducted patrols, administered weapons buy-back programs, established a constabulary force, and operated military courts. In general, the principle used by U.S. Armed Forces in the restoration of law and order has been to guide the occupied country in the reestablishment of its judicial and police system.

Operation JUST CAUSE

The restoration of Panamanian administered law and order during and after Operations JUST CAUSE proved difficult. Before Operation JUST CAUSE, the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) was composed of many agencies, including the police force, the customs department, the investigation bureaus, and the Panamanian Armed Forces. The PDF itself was responsible for maintaining law and order in Panama, albeit in a corrupt and arbitrary fashion. Because of this rot in the PDF, U.S. military planners designed Operation JUST CAUSE to defeat and dismantle the PDF.⁴

⁴ Ronald H. Cole, *Operation JUST CAUSE: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988-January 1990* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 29.

The original plans had anticipated that U.S. Armed Forces would begin peace operations after combat operations had ended, but looting became an immediate problem. Therefore, the Commander of Operation JUST CAUSE initiated peace operations to restore law and order while combat operations were still under way. Hence, the burden for the prevention of looting and other criminal activity fell squarely upon U.S. military personnel. To assist in restoring order, U.S. military leaders began by imposing curfews, and having U.S. troops patrol the streets. U.S. military patrols and U.S.-Panamanian combined patrols immediately reduced egregious acts of looting and other criminal activity.⁵

After U.S. combat operations defeated the PDF and thereby neutralized the capabilities of the police force, U.S. military personnel immediately began to advise and assist a newly installed Panamanian government in recruitment and training of Panamanians for a new police force. This task proved difficult because the initial volunteers were former PDF policemen and soldiers. From the first batch of 400 volunteers, the new Panamanian government and U.S. military advisors found only 160 to be acceptable for duty⁶

Initially, as Panamanians were accepted into the new police force, they were trained in a 20-hour, U.S. Army developed and administered training program. Once trained, the new Panamanian policemen were assigned to a patrol with a U.S. Military Policeman and/or a Special Forces Soldier. As the number of trained Panamanians increased, U.S. military forces stopped

⁵ Cole, *The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, 65.

⁶ Cole, *The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, 65.

conducting combined patrols.⁷ U.S. Armed Forces also assisted the Panamanian government in reopening jails and courts that had been looted during and immediately after combat.⁸

To enhance the maintenance of law and order, U.S. military operated a weapons-for-cash program to remove as many weapons from the civilian population as possible. U.S. Military personnel notified and publicized the exchange program via public address systems and radio broadcasts; they even posted rewards for the disclosure of weapons caches. In the end, the weapons-for-cash program was a success as large numbers of grenades, machine guns, rifle, pistols, and more, were collected and removed from circulation.⁹

Within weeks, U.S. law prohibited U.S. military personnel from training new policemen. As a result, the training and supervision of the Panamanian Police Force migrated to the civilian-run, International Criminal Investigation Training Program (ICITP). However, a year after combat operations were concluded, a “police mutiny” occurred in which a former leader of the PDF was “broken out of jail” by members of the new police force and by former PDF officers. The U.S. was not able to overcome the imbedded cultural trait of corruption that permeated even the new government, because the U.S. military was not authorized to train the new Panamanian Police Force, and the ICITP did not adequately supervise them.¹⁰

⁷ Edward F. Dander Jr., “Civil Affairs Operations” in *Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama*, eds. Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 128-129.

⁸ John T. Fishel, *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 71-72.

⁹ Robert P. Cook, Major, USA, Group Interview: *Company B, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion*. Transcription of Operation JUST CAUSE Interview Tapes (JCITs) #49 produced by XVIII Airborne Corps. Fort Bragg, NC: History Office, 11 April 1990. URL: <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/panama/jcit/jcit.htm>>. Accessed on 2 December 2000.

¹⁰ Fishel, 93-94.

Operation DESERT STORM

A visible level of public unrest and uneasiness existed in the streets of Kuwait following the liberation from Iraq; as regular Kuwaiti police forces assumed greater control, tension and unrest decreased markedly. Immediately after liberation, the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) was providing emergency services to noncombatants, while also trying to maintain order on the streets and prevent human rights violations.¹¹ During this tense period, Kuwaiti resistance members, undisciplined Kuwaiti military personnel, and Kuwaiti civilians were executing summary justice against suspected Iraqi collaborators in the streets. To prevent these kinds of human rights violations from occurring, CCATF military and civilian personnel, as well as additional U.S. Special Forces personnel actively conducted patrols and moved about the city in great numbers. Although the active presence of U.S. military personnel and civilian officials were effective, human rights abuses were not eradicated.¹² Additionally, the CCATF used generators to light key road intersections and other high priority areas at night¹³ until the electrical grid was restored because public safety and security were linked to the availability of electricity and the operation of lights at night.

[B]y the end of March, as power came on, most members of the COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS TASK FORCE felt a marked calm return to the city. Restaurants began to reopen. Fresh fruits and vegetables reappeared, first in roadside "black market" enterprises, but soon thereafter in the usual cooperatives and chain stores. Small shops, especially in the Palestinian and TCN [third

¹¹ The CCATF was primarily composed of U.S. military personnel with many specialties to include: civil affairs, logistics, explosive ordinance disposal, engineering, and medical; however, there were U.S. government civilians also attached. Additionally, the CCATF had the following attached: Saudi and Kuwaiti civil affairs teams; Saudi medical, engineering, and legal personnel, and other professional personnel. In Fishel, 163.

¹² -- Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings. 25-27 October, 1991. Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, 1991, 300-310.

¹³ -- Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings, 300-310.

country nationals] suburbs, reopened. Only the so-called "Center City," the northernmost part of the city, remained scarred and largely closed, perhaps because so few people actually live (as opposed to work) in that area, and because so many of the stores there are of the "hi-tech" variety that have difficulty getting new inventory.”¹⁴

WORLD WAR II

During World War II, U.S. Armed Forces played an important role in the restoration of law and order in both liberated and conquered countries. Upon entering an area, U.S. Armed Forces issued and enforced many regulations including curfews, mandatory blackout procedures, control of personnel movement, and possession of personal arms. In areas where the Allies had not reestablished local governments and courts (specifically in Italy and Germany), U.S. Armed Forces conducted trials in military courts to punish violators of Allied Military Government proclamations

Generally, throughout Europe, Allied military forces were conducting “peace operations” whenever they sought to establish a local, functioning police force. The establishment of and transition to a local police force to enforce law and order was critical to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to establish stable and politically acceptable governments, and to support combat operations by protecting lines of communications.

In Italy, Allied military personnel structured the local police force around members of the existing Carabinieri, the Italian State Police. U.S. counterintelligence personnel investigated each of the local Carabinieri, and as they were members of a professional force, most were found to be politically and professionally suitable. As the Italians were accepted back onto the

¹⁴ -- Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings, 306.

Carabinieri, U.S. military personnel assigned to the Allied Military Government overseeing Italy gave them specific instructions regarding assigned duties and their authority for maintaining law and order. In addition to preventing crime, the Carabinieri, under the supervision of the military government, were responsible for the collection and registration of personal weapons owned by Italian citizens. Although, the Allied Military Government did not permit the Carabinieri to carry weapons, they were still effective as demonstrated by a decrease in number of Italians committing crimes such as “looting, housebreaking, theft and jail breaking.”¹⁵

Following the surrender of Japan, U.S. Armed Forces began the occupation of its mainland, and although the Japanese police were retained as a viable organization, U.S. military personnel were occasionally required to quell unrest. The return of demobilized Japanese forces from other parts of Asia began almost immediately. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of former prisoners of war, laborers, and forced laborers from Korea, China, and Okinawa were leaving. During the two-month period following the surrender of Japan, over 700,000 Japanese had returned to southern mainland Japan, and 273,276 Koreans, Chinese, and Okinawans departed southern mainland Japan. Both Japanese and non-Japanese accumulated in port cities and the infrastructure (including food and shelter) was generally insufficient to support the transient population, particularly those port cities that were the targets of bombing during the war. A high level of animosity existed between in those Japanese who were being repatriated and the non-Japanese (especially Chinese) peoples who had been treated harshly during the war. Beyond that, shortages of food and shelter, combined with delays in transportation exacerbated the

¹⁵ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1992), 195-196.

situation. Japanese police, supervised by the U.S. military personnel, could usually deal with most of the public disturbances that occurred; however, on some occasions, U.S. troops were required to quell the violence. The Allied Military Government in Japan used Japanese labor and vessels as much as possible to transport individuals out of port cities, but violence against Japanese crews onboard repatriation ships bound for China became a problem; therefore, U.S. troops were deployed aboard these ships to keep the peace.¹⁶

In summary, U.S. Armed Forces executed “peace operations” to restore and maintain law and order. When entering an area, U.S. military personnel were required to perform law enforcement and other law-related duties. U.S. Armed Forces eventually transferred that responsibility to local authorities, and where no local authority existed, U.S. Armed forces would establish it, and then transfer the responsibility. However, even with the presence of a functioning indigenous police force, the deployment of U.S. military personnel was sometimes necessary to support the local force in restoring or maintaining law and order.

¹⁶ Benis M., Frank and Henry I. Shaw Jr., *Victory and Occupation*, vol. 5 of *The History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Development Command, 1968), 500-508.

Operations to Provide Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The second characteristic of peace operations is that they are operations to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Additionally, U.S. military personnel have attempted to make the local population self-sufficient as soon as possible. The assistance and relief provided by U.S. Armed Forces can also be further divided into four general areas: food, water, medical care, and shelter. U.S. military personnel have either physically provided these items for local populations or they have assisted in the provision of those needs. The kind and amount of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief that U.S. military personnel have been required to provide have usually depended upon the duration and intensity of combat operations and the conditions that existed prior combat operations.

Operation DESERT STORM

In planning for the liberation of Kuwait, the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) anticipated that the indigenous population would require significant humanitarian and disaster relief assistance following the ejection of the Iraqis. Entering Kuwait on the heels of coalition combat troops with 76 flatbed trucks loaded with food, water, and medical supplies,¹⁷ the CCATF conducted 1400 damage assessment surveys over the ensuing 6 weeks. Initially, the

¹⁷ -- Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings, 329.

purpose of the surveys was to ensure that the necessities for life (food, water, medical care, etc.) were available to those living in Kuwait.¹⁸ Their initial assessments determined that

no one was starving, nor were there signs of a serious medical crisis — cholera, malaria, and the like....Stores of food, and even of water, were sufficiently large to give the CCATF and the GOK [Government of Kuwait] a certain luxury of time in which to plan and make decisions.¹⁹

Soon after entering Kuwait, however, the CCATF discovered that the restoration of electricity was the Task Force's number one humanitarian assistance and disaster relief priority because electricity was linked to water, food, and medical care. Even though the water supply system had not been heavily damaged by combat or Iraqi occupation and the availability of water was not an immediate concern, electricity was required to operate the water pumps that filled reservoirs and moved water into homes. Electricity was also required to prevent the spoilage of food because homes and food distribution centers used electrically operated refrigerators. Finally, electricity was a basic requirement for the function of hospitals. Until Kuwaiti electrical power plants and electrical distribution systems could be repaired, U.S. Army generators and generators purchased by the Government of Kuwait were used at hospitals and other facilities to include government office buildings and food distribution centers.²⁰

The following statistics summarize some of the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief that CCATF provided:

1. Food
 - a. 12.5 metric tons delivered

¹⁸ As time progressed, the surveys transitioned to assessing the availability and quality of public services (roads, electricity, sanitation, etc.).

¹⁹ -- Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings, 300-306.

²⁰ -- Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings, 306.

- b. Hundreds of farm animals rescued²¹
- 2. Water—12.8 million liters of water (bulk and bottled) dispensed
- 3. Medical Supplies dispensed:
 - a. 1,250 short tons of medical supplies
 - b. Distilled water for dialysis machines
 - c. Medical evacuations were conducted
 - d. Doctors, nurses, and anesthesiologists treated people
 - e. Blood donor program was initiated
- 4. Power:
 - a. 2.8 million liters of diesel fuel
 - b. 264 generators operated²²

Operation JUST CAUSE

In Panama, U.S. military personnel conducted similar humanitarian and disaster relief operations. For the twelve days following the cessation of combat operations, U.S. military personnel distributed over 1,660 tons of food (mostly Meals Ready to Eat--MREs) to the local population.²³ Towards the end of the twelve-day period, U.S. military personnel curtailed the widespread of distribution of food; instead, Catholic Priests volunteered and were utilized by U.S. military personnel to advise and assist in targeting food distribution to truly needy Panamanians.²⁴ Besides food, U.S. military personnel dispensed over 218 tons of U.S.

²¹ A veterinarian discovered hundreds of farm animals that been abandoned by the Iraqis and were “near death from lack of water.” Since the water situation in the city was not critical, the animals were watered. These actions saved the cows, preserved a source of milk, and prevented a sanitation problem that would have been created if the cows had died. -- Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings, 305.

²² -- Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings, 271.

²³ Cole, *The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, 65-66.

²⁴ Robert P. Cook, Major, USA, Group Interview: *Company B, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion*. Transcription of Operation JUST CAUSE Interview Tapes (JCITs) #49 produced by XVIII Airborne Corps. Fort Bragg, NC: History Office, 11 April 1990. URL: <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/panama/jcit/jcit.htm>>, accessed on 2 December 2000; Robert P. Cook, Major, USA, 1LT *Robert E Gagnon, S-3 (Air), 4th Psychological Operations Group*. Transcription of Operation JUST CAUSE Interview Tapes (JCITs) #70 produced by XVIII Airborne Corps. Fort Bragg, NC: History Office, 5 April 1990. URL: <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/panama/jcit/jcit.htm>>, accessed on 2 December 2000.

Department of Defense medical supplies, providing medical treatment to Panamanians and distributing supplies directly to local hospitals.²⁵

Army infantry, Army Special Forces and United States Marines, with attached civil affairs personnel, determined sanitary conditions in rural areas, noting the severity of the problem including the availability/potability of water and the availability/reliability of electricity. U.S. military personnel also determined the availability of medical care and supplies. Meanwhile, in or near to population centers, U.S. military personnel organized and administered camps created to provide food, water, medical care, and shelter for those persons displaced by combat.²⁶

WORLD WAR II

During World War II, U.S. military personnel attempted to achieve self-sufficiency within the local population quickly in order to allocate the maximum effort towards supplying the prosecution of the war. Nevertheless, insufficient quantities of food and medical supplies necessitated military intervention and supervision. In all areas of liberated and conquered Europe, the Allies imposed rationing of food and other goods.²⁷ If military personnel recovered food from abandoned German supplies, the food would be used to feed the noncombatants in the local area; if the food was perishable, a concerted effort was made to use it before it spoiled.²⁸ Until shops and stores became operational, the Allies sold recovered or imported food to the local Mayor. The Mayor in turn would be responsible for storing the food, setting fair market

²⁵ Cole, *The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, 65-66.

²⁶ Dander Jr., 127.

²⁷ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 69-76.

²⁸ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 41.

prices for the food, and arranging for the food to be sold to the local populace. Where displaced persons or refugees were in need and had no money, the military personnel would allocate food to those people before it was sold to the local Mayor. Once shops opened, U.S. military personnel monitored the distribution of food and other items, ensuring fairness and an equitable distribution.²⁹

During and after the war, providing for displaced persons and refugees was another difficulty confronted by U.S. military personnel. In Europe, the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and refugees were a strain on the food supply and distribution network and U.S. Forces were required to assist in meeting the necessities for life (food, water, shelter, and medical care) until they could be returned to their homes or assimilated into the country where they were living.

Providing food, water, medical care, and shelter for the local population in Okinawa was a greater burden for U.S. military personnel than it had been in Europe. Because combat operations were so intense, there were “large areas where every civilian was a refugee.”³⁰ Artillery and naval gunfire destroyed homes, buildings, and public infrastructure. On southern Okinawa and the Motobu Peninsula, large amounts of land were seized by the Americans to develop the island as a staging base.

[The removal] of the natives from generations-old family holdings and removal of other islanders from more populated areas meant that they became, in effect, wards of the Island Command’s Military Government.... Even during the initial states of the battle, military government teams functioned as though they were

²⁹ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 4-9; 69-76.

³⁰ William E. Daugherty, and Marshall Andrews, *A review of U.S. Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776-1954*, (Bethesda, MD: Operations Research Office, The John Hopkins University, 1961), 379; and U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 166-167.

conducting a ‘disaster relief operation.’ In which they had to clear the islanders out of the way of the course of the fighting for reasons of mercy as well as for keeping them from hampering Tenth Army operations. In this period, as the native population became concentrated in stockades and resettlement areas in northern Okinawa the Americans gave assistance to the Okinawans as the natives reconstituted the normal functions of civil government and developed a self-sustaining local economy.³¹

The U.S. Military Government organized Okinawan civilians for salvage operations where the “...principle salvage effort was directed toward securing abandoned Japanese military and civilian food stocks....”³² These organized salvage operations lessened the logistical burden on the U.S. Armed Forces; the salvage operations, however, did not adequately meet the long-term requirements of the population. In the end, U.S. military personnel used their pre-planned relief supplies, including distillation equipment, to provide food and drinking water for the Okinawan population.³³

On Okinawa, U.S. military personnel initially provided nearly all medical care for noncombatants since there was neither sufficient medical personnel nor supplies.³⁴ In Europe, however, the limiting factor for medical care was a lack of supplies, resulting in some people requiring medical treatment to be turned away from civilian hospitals.³⁵ Therefore, U.S. military personnel concentrated on reopening and supplying local hospitals. Enabling local doctors to provide medical care reduced the burden on U.S. military medical personnel and the military supply system.

³¹ Frank and Shaw, 379-380.

³² U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 190.

³³ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 190.

³⁴ Daugherty, 379; U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 165-167.

³⁵ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 27-35.

U.S. military personnel actively conducted operations to prevent disease to include the repair and restoration of public water systems and sanitation services. U.S. military personnel would provide repair materials (pipes, pumps, etc.) and fuel (to operate pumps), and the local citizenry would complete the repairs and operate the machinery. Additionally, medical personnel closely monitored the population for epidemics and other diseases that might threaten the local population as well as U.S. military personnel. In both Europe and Asia, the military government required all doctors (both military and non-military) to provide daily reports on respiratory illnesses, venereal disease, and other communicable diseases, as well as any unusual or unexpected rates of illness.³⁶

The reestablishment of military controlled, civilian operated transportation provided important humanitarian assistance to noncombatants in Europe. Until they were able to get essential forms of transportation operating, allied military personnel reallocated military use vehicles to support the local population. For example, U.S. military personnel used military vehicles to transported food and coal to needy areas; additionally, they transported pregnant women, infants, and others that were sick, injured, or otherwise unable to make the journey to the closest hospital.³⁷ Petroleum was in very short supply in all areas of Europe, thus hindering the use of essential civilian vehicles or farm equipment. To assist in making the population more self-sufficient, Allied military personnel sold limited quantities of petroleum products to local officials so that farming equipment and other essential motor vehicles could be operated.³⁸

³⁶ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 70-76.

³⁷ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 4-13, 30-35; Coles and Weinberg 203-207.

³⁸ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 4-9.

Operation URGENT FURY

The only conflict in which U.S. military personnel did not have to widely provide or assist in the distribution of food was Grenada. Instead, the majority of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief performed by U.S. military centered on medical care. U.S. military personnel assisted in the procurement and distribution of electric generators to power hospitals and clinics until the power supply and distribution system could be repaired. U.S. military personnel also distributed medical supplies to clinics and hospitals to meet immediate and short-term requirements. Finally, U.S. military personnel helped to restore essential services at the island's mental hospital, which had been damaged by combat.³⁹

In summary, U.S. military personnel provided such humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as food, food distribution and production assistance, water, water purification equipment, water system repair, medical care, medical supplies, repair of hospitals, disease prevention, shelter, and assistance in the construction of shelter. The settings and particular requirements were different for each conflict; nevertheless, each activity matched the characteristic of the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

³⁹ Commander, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, *Operation URGENT FURY: 28 October-31 January 1984*, in A Report of Activities of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade. (Norristown, PA, Headquarters 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, 4 February 1984), 22.

Operations to Establish and Stabilize Politically Acceptable Governments

The final characteristic of peace operations is that they are designed to establish and stabilize politically acceptable governments.⁴⁰ This effort is composed of two separate but complimentary facets, the establishment of a politically acceptable government and its stabilization.

The Establishment of Politically Acceptable Governments

In each conflict addressed by this study, U.S. Armed Forces established politically acceptable governments, whether removing hostile leaders and installing new ones (e.g., Grenada) or enabling an exiled government to return to power (e.g., Kuwait). Note that U.S. military personnel may have removed or installed government leaders but they did not choose which leaders to remove or retain; U.S. government civilian leaders made that decision, often in concert with allied or coalition government leaders. A partial exception to this came during the rapid occupation of World War II countries, in which U.S. military personnel were authorized to arrest political leaders who were known war criminals and decide which local leaders to retain or replace.

⁴⁰ The definition and evaluation of acceptable and stable are subjective and are made with respect to the views of the political leaders of the United States.

WORLD WAR II

During World War II, the process of organizing and establishing civilian administration of acceptable local governments under U.S. military monitoring often began while combat operations were still in progress. As combat operations moved through an area, the maintenance of local law and order was critical. Governing by less than favorable local officials was temporarily tolerated because it allowed U.S. military personnel to focus on support to and execution of combat operations instead of military governmental duties to include issuing passes for movement, collection of taxes, provision of education. For example, during the first few weeks after the invasion of Sicily, the Allies did not make “mass arrests” of government or Fascist Party officials, but instead sought to maintain continuity in the local governments and retain as many local officials as practicable. Allied military personnel interviewed local priests and businessmen to determine the character of local leaders. Those local officials who were not grossly corrupt, had committed no atrocities, and who, in the opinion of U.S. military personnel, could be expected to execute Allied Military Government (AMG) proclamations and directives, were retained in office—even those with unfavorable political alliances. After combat operations moved farther away from the area, AMG personnel conducted investigations that are more extensive, after which point undesirable local officials and fascist party leaders were arrested.⁴¹

Initially, at the national level of Italian politics, the Allies strictly controlled all laws and governmental policies. Before a decree by the Italian national government could be issued or a new piece of legislation enacted, approval of the AMG was required. The AMG granted

⁴¹ Coles and Weingberg, 195-196.

increasing autonomy to the Italian government such that by February 1945 the role of the AMG was reduced to that of a monitoring organization, the Allied Commission. Even with their increased autonomy, the Italians were still required to keep the Commission apprised of new decrees before they were enacted and to notify the Allied Commission on any foreign negotiations.⁴²

In Germany, the reestablishment of local government was one of the Allies first priorities. In restoring local government, Allied counterintelligence personnel investigated the backgrounds of existing officials and potential officials, to include the burgermeister (mayor), police chief, city treasurer, and health and public welfare officials. To make political suitability determinations, counterintelligence personnel used official records combined with recommendations from local clergy and physicians. In general, to achieve politically acceptable local governments, AMG personnel attempted to reappoint the same local officials that were in office before the rise of Nazism. The AMG restored local law and order and rebuilt the country from behind the scenes in an effort to conceal, as much as possible, the fact that U.S. military forces were in control. Therefore, detailed instructions were given to the appointed local officials by the AMG, including what their duties were and to whom in the AMG they reported. “[T]he mayor handles 90 percent [of civil matters] and refers 10 percent to the military government team for decision. We [the military government] make every effort to govern from the background.”⁴³

⁴² Coles and Weinberg, 300-303.

⁴³ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 69.

AMG officials worked through German officials at the national level as well and minimized contact between AMG personnel and the German population. German national leaders were, however, selectively approved and closely supervised. In 1949, AMG efforts, combined with the Cold War, created an acceptable level of political stability in Western Germany, such that the Allies officially ended occupation of western Germany and established the Federal Republic of Germany.

During the battle for Okinawa, the size of the noncombatant population quickly became burdensome. Ground combat began 1 April 1945 on the island of Okinawa. “[A]n indigenous government...with limited authority, under the jurisdiction of a military governor”⁴⁴ was established within weeks; within 90 days of the start of ground combat, the Allied Military Governor was responsible for directly governing 261,115 civilians. After another 33 days, Japan had officially surrendered as the number had climbed to over 361,000 civilians.⁴⁵

On mainland Japan, instead of the instituting a direct military rule with a military governor, as was done on Okinawa, U.S. military personnel supervised the Japanese government officials in their execution of directives made by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers-Japan.⁴⁶ Some Japanese government officials were arrested, but U.S. military personnel left large segments of the Japanese government in tact; the Emperor also remained as head of state. “The decision to allow the Japanese government to continue greatly reduced American personnel requirements...”⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Frank and Shaw, 379.

⁴⁵ Frank and Shaw, 379.

⁴⁶ Frank and Shaw, 497.

⁴⁷ Daugherty and Andrews, 383-384.

Operation URGENT FURY

In Grenada, U.S. Armed Forces removed the leaders of the government and installed politically democratic leaders who were sympathetic to the strategic interests of the United States. Only one day after combat operations began in Grenada, U.S. military personnel rescued the chief of state, Governor-General Scoon, from house arrest and installed him as the leader of the interim government; a year later, the government held free elections.⁴⁸

Operation JUST CAUSE

On 17 December 1989, President G. H. W. Bush authorized the U.S. Armed Forces to remove Manuel Noriega, the defacto leader of Panama, and to dismantle his Panamanian Defense Forces. Just before midnight, 19 December 1989, and a few hours before combat operations began, the Panamanian opposition leader, Guillermo Endara, and his two vice presidents were sworn in by a Panamanian judge at Quarters 72 of the U.S. Army's Fort Clayton, Panama, in the presence of U.S. military and civilians officials. Panama held free elections in 1994.⁴⁹

Operation DESERT STORM

The Kuwaiti government remained in exile in Saudi Arabia from the time of the Iraqi invasion until a week after the cessation of hostilities. The Crown Prince of Kuwait did not reenter Kuwait for almost a week after the Operation DESERT STORM combat operations were

⁴⁸ Cole, *The planning and execution of Joint Operations in Grenada*, 47; Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Fact Book 2000*. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001). URL: <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>>. Accessed 28 February 2001.

⁴⁹ Cole, *The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, 35.

halted. Additionally, the U.S. Ambassador also would not enter Kuwait until the Crown Prince had reentered Kuwait. Consequently, during the first week of liberation, the State of Kuwait was technically under coalition military control, and by default, the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) performed a limited subset of the Kuwaiti government functions. When the Government of Kuwait did reenter the country and the U.S. embassy in Kuwait became operational, the CCATF transitioned to a support role.⁵⁰

The Stabilization of Newly Established Governments

After establishing politically acceptable governments, U.S. Armed Forces have traditionally provided assistance to stabilize the newly established government. This assistance has been provided by a military presence to safeguard the new government from real or potential political instability or public unrest and to assist in economic reconstruction. To safeguard the new, more politically favorable government, U.S. Armed Forces removed vestiges of the previous government, thereby compelling the newly formed government and population to comply with U.S. or Allied policies and directives. These safeguards included arresting international and war criminals and showing or using force in the support of the more favorable government. To assist in economic reconstruction, U.S. Armed Forces supported the new government (and the population controlled by that government) by conducting operations to improve the country's infrastructure, e.g., the communication networks, the transportation network, and the educational system.

⁵⁰ Fishel, 164-167.

WORLD WAR II

To remove the vestiges of the old government in Italy, U.S. military personnel set out to remove fascism from Italian national politics. To start the process, U.S. military personnel resurrected pre-fascist institutions and governmental titles, arrested fascist party leaders and government officials, and appointed non-fascists to positions in government, on courts, and in other places of authority. The Allied Military Government (AMG) seized news agencies, radio networks, and theaters, thus controlling the information disseminated from those sources. Additionally, the AMG reviewed and restricted the distribution of published materials via controls on copyrighting and publishing. The eradication of fascism from teaching materials and the education system slowed this process. Because the Allies did not anticipate a requirement for paper to reprint textbooks and other teaching materials, the schools remained closed until paper was imported into Italy and textbooks reprinted.⁵¹

In Germany, military personnel implemented the process of de-nazification as soon as the Allies gained control of any portion of the country. Radio, telephone, telegraph, and newspaper operations were halted until U.S. military personnel had purged the workers that operated and maintained these agencies during of the Nazi regime. To keep German citizens abreast of world and other news items, U.S. military personnel broadcast the news and information via loud speakers mounted on trucks. The de-nazification process removed so many skilled personnel from the telecommunications organizations that expertise from the Army Signal Corps was required to get them running again. As in Italy, schools and other educational institutions were

⁵¹ Coles and Weinberg, 391-403.

closed until Allied military personnel purged the educational system of Nazi teachers and teaching materials.⁵²

In Japan, the presence of U.S. Armed Forces enforced Japanese compliance with Allied policies and the terms of surrender, especially demilitarization. The terms of surrender called for Japan to “disarm and demobilize under their own supervision.”⁵³ While the Japanese were in this process, U.S. military units, primarily infantry and artillery, occupied each prefecture (state) on mainland Japan. After an inventory of armaments and equipment was completed, Japanese installations were turned over to the U.S. military for safeguarding and/or destruction. U.S. military personnel supervised as “[w]eapons and equipment declared surplus to the needs of occupation troops were converted into scrap, mainly by Japanese labor, and then turned over to the Home Ministry for use in essential civilian industries.”⁵⁴ The disposal of ordnance was determined to be too dangerous to risk the safety of American troops, so the fewest number of U.S. military personnel deemed necessary supervised as the Japanese sank, buried, or exploded the ordnance. Over just a few months, U.S. Armed Forces had supervised the demobilization of the Japanese military where “90 percent of the military facilities in the Home Islands had been razed and approximately 20 percent of the ammunition and explosives stored in bunkers all over Japan had been destroyed.”⁵⁵

To rid the Japanese and German governments of Nazis, militarists, and those who committed war atrocities, U.S. military personnel quickly began the process of apprehending

⁵² U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 76-97.

⁵³ Frank and Shaw, 497.

⁵⁴ Frank and Shaw, 498.

⁵⁵ Frank and Shaw, 511.

accused war criminals for trial. In Europe, Allied military personnel provided logistics, security and other support, including the confinement or execution of war criminals. Six months after the surrender of Germany, 24 Nazi leaders went on trial before an International War Military Tribunal in Nürnberg, Germany. In Japan, events were similar; an International Military Tribunal tried Japanese national leaders accused of war crimes. Those Japanese merely accused of atrocities, however, were tried by the Military Tribunals of the Allied Nation assigned to the area where the crime was alleged to have occurred.⁵⁶

U.S. military personnel deployed to aid new governments until they could handle their own internal affairs, including problems with political dissent and public unrest. The decision to utilize U.S. military personnel in this role was driven by the national politics within that country and the United States, meaning the use of U.S. Armed Forces to quell public unrest was not automatic. In Belgium, Allied military forces were not authorized to intervene in Belgian government affairs except to protect military operations. Should Belgian authorities request in writing U.S. military support, and it be approved by the Allied Command, the government of Belgium could expect U.S. military help in remedying disturbance or unrest.⁵⁷

The physical presence of American and Allied military personnel stabilized Italian local and national governments during the liberation and occupation of Italy. In September 1943, on the island of Sicily, the presence of U.S. military personnel provided such a stabilizing and calming

⁵⁶ Frank and Shaw, 498; Gavan Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific*. (New York: William Morrow and Co, Inc., 1994), 363-370.

⁵⁷ Coles and Weinberg, 803-808.

effect that the inhabitants of the Commune of Florida, in the Syracuse Province, rioted on a rumor that the AMG was to be withdrawn.⁵⁸

U.S. Armed Forces had the same effect throughout Italy. Italy had not been economically strong before the war, and an Italian government newly liberated from German occupation was ill-equipped to deal with the devastation brought on by the war. Food was in very short supply and hunger widespread; a shortage of raw materials limited manufacturing in those factories not destroyed by war and unemployment was high. In 1945, the Italian economy suffered another blow with that year's poor agricultural harvest. As a result, civilian unrest and discontent increased, giving strength to a growing communist movement. In a message to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on August 3, 1945, Field Marshal Alexander wrote: "The authority of the Italian Government at present largely rests on the presence of Allied Troops...."⁵⁹ To assist the Italians in managing the unrest and preventing the communist movement from gaining further strength permitted the Italians to increase the size of the Carabinieri and Army. Eventually, a stabilized Italian government and strengthened economy permitted the management of internal dissent and unrest with Italian assets. By December 1947 the authority of the Italian government was finally strong enough to stand without the presence of Allied Troops and the Allies officially ended their occupation of Italy.

As they fought their way across Western Europe, the Allies hired local civilians, providing short-term assistance to local economies. The Allies tapped a non-military, locally available source of labor that accomplished a myriad of tasks and aided the war effort. In France, the

⁵⁸ Coles and Weinberg, 211.

⁵⁹ Coles and Weinberg, 624.

Allies hired local civilians to catalog burial locations of Allied military personnel and provide information concerning the identification and location of former German storage sites, manufacturing plants, and factories used in the German war effort. As abandoned German stockpiles and plants were discovered, Allied military personnel hired the civilians to collect, inventory, and dispose of abandoned equipment and supplies. If military equipment, armaments, ammunition, or explosives were found, they were inventoried and guarded until properly disposed.⁶⁰

The presence of displaced persons and refugees complicated the restart of the European economy. Allied military personnel set up labor bureaus in many areas and employed refugees and displaced persons in sewing centers, shoe repair shops, wood cutting details, and food distribution centers. The profits generated by these activities were then reinvested back into the displaced persons and refugees support operations.⁶¹ The U.S. military used similar support operations on Okinawa, Japan.⁶² These economic activities helped restart local economies, releasing economic productivity through the people. World War II combat operations had devastated many areas, and this infusion of cash reinvigorated the local cycles of buying and selling goods and services.

Nevertheless, the economic rehabilitation and reconstruction after World War II progressed slowly. The limited fuel supply was particularly problematic for U.S. military personnel, hampering both short and long-term economic rehabilitation and reconstruction in Europe. Coal

⁶⁰ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 4-9.

⁶¹ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division. Field Operations of Military Government Units. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1949, 45.

⁶² U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 166 & 190.

was tied to the production of electricity, which in turn was needed to support manufacturing; it served as the foundation for Europe's economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. Therefore, U.S. military personnel assisted in the production and shipment of coal, which has ceased in many areas due to the war. Allied military personnel ensured that miners were paid back wages and set the workers' daily caloric intake ration at a level that would enable them to mine productively. Some coalmines had flooded because they had not been worked for a significant amount of time and Allied military engineers used their pumps to empty the mines of water. Once a mine was working, Allied military personnel administered its operation in accordance with applicable international regulations, ensuring that the mine generated a profit. In some areas, Allied military personnel even assisted in the transportation of coal. Once widespread coal production was restored, economic rehabilitation and reconstruction could begin.⁶³ However, it was not until the Marshall Plan was initiated did European economic revitalization truly begin in earnest.

In the banking and financial area, 1,409 military officers on the Allied Commission advised and assisted the Italians for the two years following the defeat of the Germans in Italy. Banks were reopened with under the guidance and supervision of Allied military personnel.⁶⁴ Additionally, since the Italian government did not have the ink, paper, or other necessary supplies available to print currency until 1946, the United States minted Italian currency and delivered it through the U.S. military.⁶⁵

⁶³ U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, 72-73.

⁶⁴ Coles and Weinberg, 300-303 & 384-385.

⁶⁵ Coles and Weinberg, 353.

Operation URGENT FURY

In Grenada after Operation URGENT FURY, U.S. military personnel addressed medium and long-term public works projects to create and support a self-sustaining economy. Operation URGENT FURY did not cause widespread physical damage or destruction, but the preceding four years of a Marxist economic philosophy had left Grenada's economy and public infrastructure in tatters. U.S. military personnel determined that the secondary schools, teachers' college, and vocational arts schools were in significant disrepair and assisted in their rehabilitation. At one school, US military personnel identified a deficiency in the number of desks and acquired a sufficient number to meet the need.⁶⁶ U.S. military personnel specifically aided in the repair and restoration of the water supply system, the repair of damaged buildings, the repair and construction of roads, the restoration of the telephone system, the restoration of electricity generation and production, and the rehabilitation of the educational system.⁶⁷

The key to Grenada's long-term economic stability and growth, however, was tourism. Tourism had at one time been thirty percent of the Gross National Product. At the start of Operation URGENT FURY, tourism was a fraction of its former size. To jump start the tourism industry and provide a source of long-term economic growth, the Commander, U.S. Forces Grenada, requested Major Paul R. Decker, by name, be called back to active duty. A reservist, he was a "tourist expert" with experience as a Deputy Director of Tourism for the City of

⁶⁶ Commander, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, 16 & 23

⁶⁷ Commander, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, 17-22

Philadelphia. Major Decker's expertise helped to reestablish a tourist trade and generate a cash flow for the government of Grenada.⁶⁸

Operation JUST CAUSE

After World War II, U.S. military personnel arrested Nazis, fascists, and war criminals; in Panama, U.S. Armed Forces captured and arrested Manuel Noriega, leader of the Panamanian Defense Force and an indited drug trafficker. While combat operations were being conducted, a Civil-Military Operations Task Force (COMCMOTF) "worked around the clock to restore services, [and] establish a government of Panama. U.S. military personnel assisted by providing advice and guidance with respect to the reorganization of the various departments and agencies of the government, and by coordinating the activities of U.S. government and private relief agencies."⁶⁹ Additionally, they developed "a grassroots organization to 'sell' the Endara [the new Panamanian President] government to the public."⁷⁰

After combat operations ceased, both the U.S. Ambassador to Panama and the Commander in Chief of Southern Command believed a strong U.S. military presence was required "to separate and 'civilianize' the functions once monopolized by the PDF."⁷¹ Nevertheless, within a month, all U.S. combat troops that were not in Panama before Operation JUST CAUSE were redeployed back to the United States. The U.S. National Command Authority wanted to reduce the number of U.S. military personnel in Panama to pre-Operation JUST CAUSE levels as soon

⁶⁸ Commander, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, 17.

⁶⁹ Fishel, 67-68.

⁷⁰ Cole, *The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, 53.

⁷¹ Cole, *The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, 58.

as possible. This decision may have hampered efforts to institutionalize “loyalty to civilian authority and democratic government.”⁷²

U.S. military personnel provided short-term economic assistance by offering temporary employment to local Panamanians. Often, the Panamanians received their wages in cash from U.S. military comptrollers. However, there were not enough comptrollers in Panama to disburse payments at every work site. This necessitated U.S. military personnel paying wages in the form of food, particularly MREs. The most common form of employment was the working party, most often organized to collect trash. Besides providing food or money, the collection and disposal of trash improved sanitation and lessened the probability of disease. Additionally, some work parties directly benefited the U.S. Armed Forces by clearing airports of debris and collecting parachutes that had been used during Operation JUST CAUSE.⁷³

Long term economic support involved a prioritized and coordinated list of over 200 “embassy-approved,” civic action projects, the last of which was completed 68 months after combat operations ended. The projects focused on improving the infrastructure to contribute to economic growth. Projects were mostly in the areas of education, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation.⁷⁴

⁷² Cole, *The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, 9.

⁷³ Robert K Wright, *COL Barry S. Baer: Commander 18th Corps Finance Group*. Transcription of Operation JUST CAUSE Interview Tapes (JCITs) #31 produced by XVIII Airborne Corps. Fort Bragg, NC: History Office, 15 Mar 1990. URL: <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/panama/jcit/jcit.htm>>, accessed on 2 December 2000. and Cook, Robert P., Major, USA, Group Interview: *Company B, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion*.

⁷⁴ Edwards, 130; Cole, 9-29; Fichel, 229.

Operation DESERT STORM

In Kuwait, the restoration of oil production was the key to Kuwait's economic stability. In the wake of Iraq's ejection from Kuwait, hundreds of oil wells were set afire. Before oil production could be restarted, the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) coordinated a massive oil well firefighting operation. In coordinating the firefighting effort, the CCATF planned the logistical movement of civilian oil well firefighters and their heavy equipment from Texas to Kuwait via C-5A Galaxy aircraft. Additionally, the CCATF provided communications support and explosive ordinance disposal training to firefighters, coordinating and directing U.S. Army and government of Kuwait hired transportation to move personnel and supplies around the country.⁷⁵

In summary, U.S. Armed Forces used military, economic, and political power to establish and stabilize politically acceptable governments. In each peace operation, U.S. military personnel removed and installed political leaders, or assisted in their removal and installation. Additionally, U.S. military personnel stabilized governments by the show or use of military force, and by economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

⁷⁵ -- Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings, 310-311.

Conclusion

This study characterized peace operations that were limited to conflicts in which U.S. Armed Forces defeated an enemy in another country and established a new government. The Joint Task Force Handbook for Peace Operations would recognize that the operations characterized in this paper were each “conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.”⁷⁶ These experiences also support the claim that “[t]here is no standard peace operations mission,” and demonstrate that peace operations can be generally separated into three basic categories, operations to restore law and order, operations to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, operations to establish and stabilize politically acceptable governments.

These categories often occur simultaneously and are interdependent. For instance, U.S. Armed Forces in Kuwait conducted operations to restore law and order while other U.S. military forces provided humanitarian assistance. Similarly, the electricity provided through peace operations to help restore law and order also supported humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Peace operations and combat operations are complementary. While military strategies center on combat operations, peace operations have historically been undefined. Where their importance remains unrecognized, military leaders are left under-prepared for what may be required to completely accomplish their mission. It is through the combination of combat and

⁷⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07, III-12. Joint Warfighting Center. *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997. I-1

peace operations that favorable political solutions and international relationships are achieved. This combination, when professionally executed, is the use of decisive force.





Figure 1 shows conceptually how peace operations bridge the gap between defeating the enemy and securing a favorable political solution and international relationship. In this study, the establishment of a stable and politically acceptable government was achieved by the execution of military force to impose economic and political power. While commitment of sufficient military power may achieve a political resolution favorable to U.S. national interests, it cannot maintain that favorable resolution indefinitely. Figure 2 shows how the principle of decisive force is used in conjunction with the other elements of national power, specifically economic power and political power, to achieve the long term desired result: a political resolution favorable to U.S. national interests. Peace operations provide a platform upon which economic power and political or diplomatic power meet to bring about a favorable political solution and international relationship.



PEACE OPERATIONS AS PLATFORM

Figure 2

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